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SUBJECT: MASIYIWA FLOATS MDC-ZANU-PF POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT

PRETORIA 00001632 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Raymond L. Brown. Reason
s 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (C) SUMMARY. South African businessman and unofficial MDC advisor Strive Masiyiwa told Harare PolEconChief and Pretoria PolOffs July 24 that he believed a power sharing agreement would be signed between ZANU-PF and the MDC within two weeks. Masiyiwa has drafted a proposed agreement under which Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe would remain as ceremonial president. MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister, and there would be a division of government ministries. According to Masiyiwa, the draft was presented to Mugabe who approved it in principle. Masiyiwa is concerned, however, that South African President Thabo Mbeki may attempt to impose his own agreement which would be more advantageous to ZANU-PF. He urged the U.S. and EU to impress upon South Africa the importance of reaching a "quality" agreement that would satisfy criteria for reengagement. END SUMMARY.

Masiyiwa's Draft Agreement

12. (C) Under Masiyiwa's agreement, the 1980 Zimbabwean Constitution would be used as a basis for constituting power-sharing transitional government with a life of two years. Mugabe would become head of state (ceremonial) and Tsvangirai would be head of government as Prime Minister. ZANU-PF and the MDC would each appoint one Deputy Prime Minister. ZANU-PF's Deputy Prime Minister would be in charge of defense, and the MDC's would head home affairs (police). The Prime Minister, the Deputies, and an additional ZANU-PF minister would constitute a national security council to which the Central Intelligence Organization would report. Additionally, ZANU-PF would select eight ministers, MDC Tsvangirai would select eight ministers, and MDC Mutambara would select one. The parties would select five independent ministers, presumably technocrats, to head the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Land Resettlement, Agriculture, and State Enterprises (parastatals). (A copy of the agreement sent to AF/S and Embassy Harare.)

MDC and ZANU-PF Reaction

13. (C) According to Masiyiwa, Tsvangirai supported the

agreement. Masiyiwa also said that an intermediary had presented the draft agreement to Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono who had in turn presented it to Mugabe. Gono told the intermediary that he had discussed it with Mugabe and Mugabe's wife, Grace. Both Mugabe and Grace reportedly were agreeable to the agreement with several amendments, including that Mugabe would be allowed to serve as President indefinitely and would not have to retire at a certain time.

¶4. (C) Masiyiwa thought Mugabe was willing to enter into an agreement which ended ZANU-PF power because Gono had convinced him the economy was almost beyond repair and something had to be done. Also, Mugabe had been stung by African criticism; he could no longer claim it was only the West that was opposed to him. He therefore felt it necessary to bring an end to the crisis that would win support from the region and staunch his growing isolation.

¶5. (C) Although the military was not part of the negotiations, Masiyiwa thought that Mugabe was still in control of the government and could win military support for Qontrol of the government and could win military support for an agreement, as long as an amnesty provision was included to protect them from possible prosecution. Masiyiwa was concerned that Emmerson Mnangagwa would resist an agreement, but thought that if an agreement appeared likely Mnangagwa would angle for a significant position in the new government.

South African and Pressure for an Agreement

¶6. (C) Masiyiwa said Mbeki was anxious to secure a prompt agreement before he assumed the SADC Presidency and to ensure

PRETORIA 00001632 002.2 OF 002

his legacy. He understood there was also pressure from Russia and China following the UNSC vote; the ANC had promised Russian and China an agreement would occur before the Olympics.

¶7. (C) Because of this pressure, Masiyiwa was concerned that Mbeki would press for a quick agreement that was less favorable to the MDC than his draft agreement. Mbeki was not concerned about a good agreement, he averred, but only one that would pass muster with other African leaders.

¶8. (C) Masiyiwa expressed a lack of confidence in the MDC's resolve to hold firm and negotiate a good agreement along the lines of his draft. He noted that Tsvangirai had begun negotiations without even securing the return of his passport which had been seized by the government after his return to Zimbabwe in June. Also, after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between ZANU-PF and the MDC on July 22, Tsvangirai had publicly renounced violence, but Mugabe had not done so. Masiyiwa thought that Tendai Biti, Tsvangirai's lead negotiator, had been broken during his time in custody and could be manipulated by ZANU-PF. He believed the Mutambara faction's lead negotiator, Welshman Ncube, was "slippery" and would not stand up to ZANU-PF.

International Support for an Agreement

¶9. (C) Masiyiwa said he warned Tsvangirai he could be picking up a "poison chalice" if he entered into an agreement that was not satisfactory to the U.S. and the EU. A transitional government needed Western support and would fail without it. Relatedly, Masiyiwa urged the U.S. to impress upon Mbeki and his mediation team that a "quality agreement" was necessary; otherwise there would be no Western economic support and an agreement would be hollow.

¶10. (C) Although Masiyiwa has definite ideas on what the ultimate agreement should be, we don't know whether Mugabe and ZANU-PF will ultimately accept Masiyiwa's draft agreement or whether the South Africans will present (or have already presented) something else. Regardless, it is increasingly likely that there will be a power-sharing agreement reached between ZANU-PF and the MDC, quite possibly sooner rather than later. The parties are now working out the details of the agreement. ZANU-PF and Mugabe are not willing to cede power to Tsvangirai, and it appears that the MDC will accept a government that includes a substantial role for Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The MDC is tired and has apparently calculated that it is better to try and to bring peace and stability now through an agreement, with the promise of elections in two years, than for Zimbabwe to continue to suffer violence, much of it targeted at the MDC.

¶11. (C) If an agreement comes to pass, the new government will undoubtedly ask for U.S. UK, and international financial institution assistance. In fact, Tsvangirai may make the request on behalf of the government.

¶12. (C) Ambassador will speak with Tsvangirai over the weekend to reiterate to him that a substantive role for Mugabe is a non-starter for the USG.

¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Harare.
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